Both agreed that former Chinese leader Hu Yaobang stood for a much wiser policy on Tibet in the 1980s. Both agreed that Buddhism could play a role in bringing both groups together, as many Chinese are interested in Tibetan Buddhism these days, and Tibetan monasteries flourish due to Chinese contributors. Kelsang Gyaltsen appreciated that the general view among Chinese intellectuals about Tibet and Tibetans had improved drastically over the last few years, and that a group of Chinese intellectuals criticized the Tibet policy in an open letter to their government in March.
Gu Xuewu pointed out that, while the crucial post of party head in Lhasa has been reserved for a Han Chinese, the majority of cadres on all levels remain Tibetans. He thinks the Dalai Lama's proposal of a "third way" - autonomy within China - is unrealistic, not least because the Chinese government would be afraid of other minorities claiming similar rights.
Whereas according to Kelsang Gyaltsen the Chinese negotiators on Tibet (whom he otherwise characterized as hardliners) agreed to discuss autonomy in the next round of talks in October, it also became clear that the Tibetans' position is not without contradictions here: They claim autonomy status for those regions with a Tibetan majority or (?) sizable Tibetan population, also in other provinces, i.e. Qinghai and Sichuan. And they expect that these territories are also protected in some way from the influx of Chinese immigrants. But what about those areas where the Chinese are already in a majority - such as the city of Lhasa itself?